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Abstract—Modern mobile phones are increasingly being used for 
more services that require modern security mechanisms such as 
the public-key cryptosystem RSA. It is, however, well-known that 
public-key cryptography demands considerable computing 
resources and that RSA encryption is much faster than RSA 
decryption. It is consequently an interesting question if RSA as a 
whole can be executed efficiently on modern mobile phones. 
In this paper, we explore the efficiency on modern mobile phones 
of  variants of the RSA cryptosystem, covering CRT, Multi-Prime 
RSA, Multi-Power RSA, Rebalanced RSA and R-Prime RSA by 
comparing the encryption and decryption time using a simple 
Java implementation and a typical RSA setup. 
Keywords—Public-key cryptography; RSA; software; mobile 
phones. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Today, the virtually ubiquitous mobile phone is used for 
more complex services than just traditional voice calls and text 
messages. Many of these services require modern security 
mechanisms such as the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol. 
A number of these mechanisms, including SSL, make use of 
public-key cryptography. 
It is, however, well-known that public-key cryptography 
demands considerable computing resources. On limited 
platforms such as the mobile phone, this problem is 
exacerbated and one may ask if it is possible at all to 
implement public-key cryptography efficiently on mobile 
phones, i.e. where the time needed to perform encryption or 
decryption is sufficiently small to avoid having a negative 
impact on the user experience while retaining the security of 
the cryptosystem. 
In 2004, Groβshadl and Tillich showed that both encryption 
and decryption using public-key cryptography based on elliptic 
curves could be executed efficiently on some mobile phones 
[7]. The authors also showed that encryption using the public-
key cryptosystem RSA [1] was feasible but that decryption was 
not. To the best of our knowledge, no basic research results 
have been published showing that (the decryption of) RSA can 
be executed efficiently on mobile phones. 
This paper investigates methods to optimize the execution 
of the decryption of RSA on modern mobile phones. We will 
do this by looking into various variants of the original RSA 
cryptosystem, thus taking an algorithmic approach rather than 
discussing hardware or software optimization schemes. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section II, we 
introduce the original RSA cryptosystem and its variants 
(except Batch RSA, which has low relevance for our 
investigation), and in section III discuss our implementation of 
these cryptosystems in a specific mobile environment. In 
section IV, we show our experimental results of these 
cryptosystems on modern mobile phones and comment on the 
degree to which the variants improve the decryption time of the 
original RSA. Finally, in section V, we conclude the paper and 
take stock on the state of RSA as a whole on modern mobile 
phones, i.e. whether both encryption and decryption can be 
executed efficiently on modern mobile phones. 
This paper is based on the results of a project carried out by 
the authors at the University of Copenhagen in the spring of 
2008 [9]. 
II. RSA AND ITS FAST VARIANTS 
The original RSA cryptosystem was proposed in 1978 by 
Rivest, Shamir and Adelman [1] and consists of three parts: 
• Key generation: Given an integer n, generate two 
different primes p and q of (n/2)-bit each and compute 
N = pq and φ(N) = (p-1)(q-1). Choose a random integer 
1 < e < φ(N) such that gcd(e,φ(N)) = 1. Next, compute 
the uniquely defined integer 1 < d < φ(N) satisfying ed 
≡ 1 (mod φ(N)). The public key is <N,e> and the 
private key <N,d>. 
• Encryption: To encrypt a message X with the public 
key <N,e>, transform the message X to an integer M in 
{0,…,N-1} and compute the ciphertext C = Me mod N. 
• Decryption: To decrypt the ciphertext C with the 
private key <N,d>, compute M = Cd mod N and employ 
the reverse transformation to obtain the message X 
from M.1 
                                                          
1 Note, we use the notation a mod b to mean the remainder when a is 
divided by b. The notation a ≡ c (mod b) means that a and c result in 
the same remainder when divided by b, i.e. a mod b = c mod b. 
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Key generation is only performed occasionally so the 
efficiency of that part is less important than the two other parts, 
encryption and decryption. Their efficiency is determined by 1) 
the transformation of the message X to the integer M, and back, 
and 2) the modular exponentiations Me mod N and Cd mod N. 
The transformations can be performed with standard 
algorithms, e.g. from the Public Key Cryptography Standards 
(PKCS) published by RSA Security [13]. This leaves the 
modular exponentiation as the single most important 
component of RSA in regards to its efficiency. 
There exist a number of different methods for fast modular 
exponentiation [6]. In general, a modular exponentiation ab 
mod c can be performed using t-1 modular squarings and h-1 
modular multiplications where t is the length of the binary 
representation of b and h is the number of 1's in the binary 
representation (i.e. its Hamming weight). 
In practice, an often used method to perform modular 
exponentiations is the so-called repeated square-and-multiply 
algorithm [10]. In its binary version, the algorithm processes a 
single bit of the exponent b at a time and on every iteration 
squares its intermediate result and multiplies it with a if the 
current bit is set. Thus, the algorithm always performs t-1 
modular squarings and at most t-1 modular multiplications. 
Since an upper bound on a single modular multiplication – and 
therefore also squaring – is O(v2), the repeated square-and-
multiply algorithm has a running time of O(tv2) where t is the 
bitlength of the exponent b and v is the bitlength of the 
modulus c. 
Given this bound, the encryption exponent e in the original 
RSA cryptosystem is typically chosen to be a small number, 
often 216 + 1. There are two reasons for this: the relative short 
bitlength of 216 + 1 will result in a small amount of modular 
squarings, and 216 + 1 has only two 1's in its binary 
representation leading to the fewest possible modular 
multiplications for valid RSA encryption exponents, namely 
one [14]. Expressed informally, choosing e this small almost 
effectively yields an encryption running time dependent only 
on the bitlength n of the modulus N, i.e. O(n2). The structure of 
the decryption exponent d cannot be tailored to fit the repeated 
square-and-multiply algorithm in the same way, but will often 
be long and consist of a random number of 1's in its binary 
representation. The worst case scenario is that |d| ≈ |N| yielding 
a running time of O(n3). This means that encryption is much 
faster than decryption in the original RSA. 
A number of variants of the original RSA cryptosystem 
have been published over the years all seeking to improve the 
time-consuming decryption operation. We take a closer look at 
these variants in the following subsections. 
A. CRT RSA 
CRT RSA is the most commonly known RSA variant for 
speeding up decryption. It was first described by Couvreur and 
Quisquater in 1982 [5]. The idea behind CRT RSA is to split 
the costly decryption into two smaller and faster modular 
exponentiations using the Chinese Remainder Theorem, hence 
the acronym CRT RSA. 
The Chinese Remainder Theorem tells us that a system of r 
congruences 
x ≡ a1 (mod n1), …, x ≡ ar (mod nr), 
where n1,…,nr are relatively prime integers and a1,…,ar 
ordinary integers has a unique solution modulo N = n1n2···nr. 
This solution can be written as 
x = (a1N1y1 + … + arNryr) mod N, 
where Ni = N/ni and yi = Ni-1 mod ni for 1 ≤ i ≤ r [15]. CRT 
RSA uses the Chinese Remainder Theorem the following way: 
• Key generation: Generate e and d the same way as in 
the original RSA. Next, compute dp = d mod p-1 and dq 
= d mod q-1. The public key is <N,e> and the private 
key <p,q,dp,dq>. 
• Encryption: Encryption is the same as for the original 
RSA, C = Me mod N. 
• Decryption: Decryption is split into the following 
computations. First, compute Mp = Cdp mod p and Mq = 
Cdq mod q. Then, using the Chinese Remainder 
Theorem, find M as M = (Mpq(q-1 mod p) + Mqp(p-1 
mod q)) mod N. 
If we ignore the contribution from the sum function of the 
Chinese Remainder Theorem, decryption using CRT RSA 
requires two times O((n/2)3) since the bitlength of both the 
exponents and the moduli are n/2 and a single modular 
exponentiation has an upper bound of O(tv2) where t is the 
bitlength of the exponent and v is the bitlength of the modulus. 
Compared to the O(n3) decryption of the original RSA, CRT 
RSA improves decryption time with a factor 
n3 / (2 · (n/2)3) = 4.2 
B. Multi-Prime RSA 
Multi-Prime RSA represents a natural generalisation of 
CRT RSA: By adding more primes to the generation of N, 
decryption can be split into an arbitrary number of smaller 
exponentiations instead of just two. This variant of the original 
RSA was first described by Collins et al. i 1997 [4]: 
• Key generation: Given two integers n and r ≥ 3, 
generate r different primes p1,…, pr each (n/r)-bit long. 
Set N = ∏ri=1 pi and φ(N) = ∏ri=1 (pi-1). Compute e and 
d as in the original RSA. Next, compute di = d mod pi-
1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ r. The public key is <N,e> and the private 
key <p1,…,pr,d1,…,dr>. 
• Encryption: Encryption is the same as for the original 
RSA, C = Me mod N. 
• Decryption: Decryption is split into r exponentiations, 
Mi = Cdi mod pi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ r. Using the Chinese 
Remainder Theorem, M is found as M = (M1N1y1 + … 
+ MrNryr) mod N where Ni = N/pi and yi = Ni-1 mod pi 
for 1 ≤ i ≤ r. 
                                                          
2 This sort of big-o manipulation is formally not sound as big-o 
implies an arbitrary constant factor, but it does give a rough notion of 
the speed-up to expect in practice. 
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If we again ignore the contribution of the Chinese 
Remainder Theorem, decryption in Multi-Prime RSA requires 
r times O((n/r)3). Compared to the O(n3) decryption of the 
original RSA, Multi-Prime RSA improves decryption time with 
a factor 
n3 / (r · (n/r)3) = r2. 
 
Obviously, the individual primes need to have a certain size 
to guard against factorisation attacks. This puts a natural limit 
to the size of r and thus the actual improvement in decryption. 
Hinek suggest the following guidelines [8]: 
 
n 1024 2048 4096 8192 
max r 3 3 4 4 
 
C. Multi-Power RSA 
Multi-Power RSA is a variant of Multi-Prime RSA. In 
Multi-Prime RSA, the modulus N consists of r different primes 
whereas the modulus in Multi-Power RSA has the structure N 
= pr-1q for r ≥ 3. As shown below, this different structured 
modulus gives rise to a more efficient decryption than Multi-
Prime RSA. Multi-Power RSA was first described by Takagi in 
1998 [16]: 
• Key generation: Given two integers n and r ≥ 3, 
generate two different primes p and q each (n/r)-bit 
long. Set N = pr-1q. Compute e as in the original RSA 
and d satisfying ed ≡ 1 (mod (p-1)(q-1)). Finally, 
compute dp = d mod p-1 og dq = d mod q-1. The public 
key is <N,e> and the private key <p,q,dp,dq>. 
• Encryption: Encryption is the same as for the original 
RSA, C = Me mod N. 
• Decryption: Conceptually, decryption is the same as 
CRT RSA. First, compute Mq = Cqdq mod q where Cq = 
C mod q and Mp = Cpdp mod pr-1 where Cp = C mod pr-
1. Next, apply the Chinese Remainder Theorem to find 
M. 
Using Hensel Lifting, Mp can be computed using only one 
modular exponentiation modulu p instead of modulu pr-1, and 
some extra arithmetic. Ignoring the contribution from the 
Chinese Remainder Theorem and the extra arithmetic from the 
Hensel Lifting, this means that decryption in Multi-Power RSA 
requires two times O((n/r)3). Compared to the O(n3) decryption 
of the original RSA, Multi-Power RSA improves decryption 
time with a factor 
n3 / (2 · (n/r)3) = r3/2. 
 
With respect to the security of Multi-Power RSA, the same 
guidelines as for Multi-Prime RSA apply limiting the size of r 
and thus the actual improvement in practice. The special 
Lattice Factoring Method designed to factor integers with the 
structure N = prq is not a security issue for Multi-Power RSA 
as it cannot be efficiently applied for usual sizes of N in RSA 
[3]. 
D. Rebalanced RSA 
Basically, in the original RSA, encryption is more efficient 
than decryption because e is small and d is large. A 
straightforward way to optimise decryption would be to 
“switch” the exponents, i.e. make e large and d small. 
However, this is not to be recommended. Small values of d 
open up for Wiener's Low Decryption Exponent Attack [2]. 
Instead Wiener proposed in 1990 the variant Rebalanced RSA 
[17] that retains the size of d but makes dp = d mod p-1 and dq 
= d mod q-1 small (at the expense of a larger e): 
• Key generation: Given integers n and w, generate two 
different primes p and q each (n/2)-bit long such that 
gcd(p-1,q-1) = 2. Set N = pq and φ(N) = (p-1)(q-1). 
Compute two w-bit integers dp and dq satisfying 
gcd(dp,p-1) = gcd(dq,q-1) = 1 and dp ≡ dq (mod 2). Find 
a d such that d = dp mod p-1 and d = dq mod q-1. 
Compute e = d-1 mod φ(N). The public key is <N,e> 
and the private key <p,q,dp,dq>. 
• Encryption: Encryption is the same as for the original 
RSA, C = Me mod N, but with a much larger e (on the 
order of N). 
• Decryption: Decryption is the same as for CRT RSA 
but with smaller dp and dq – each w-bit long in 
Rebalanced RSA versus (n/2)-bit in CRT RSA. 
Usually, w ≥ 160 and n/2 ≥ 512. 
If we again ignore the contribution of the Chinese 
Remainder Theorem, decryption in Rebalanced RSA requires 
two times O(w(n/2)2). Compared to the O(n3) decryption of the 
original RSA, Rebalanced RSA improves decryption time with 
a factor 
n3 / (2w · (n/2)2) = 2n/w. 
 
With respect to the security of Rebalanced RSA, it is 
recommended to set w ≥ 160 thereby limiting the actual 
improvement of decryption in practice. Note also that the 
speed-up in decryption comes at the cost of a much slower 
encryption. In the original RSA, e is small – typically 16 bit or 
less – whereas in Rebalanced RSA, e is on the order of N. This 
means that encryption in Rebalanced RSA is as slow as 
decryption in the original RSA. 
E. R-Prime RSA 
In Rebalanced RSA, decryption is the same as in CRT 
RSA. Since Multi-Prime RSA is a generalisation of CRT RSA, 
why not generalise Rebalanced RSA to use Multi-Prime RSA 
in its decryption as well. This is the idea behind R-Prime RSA, 
first described by Paixão in 2003 [12]: 
• Key generation: Given n and w, generate r ≥ 3 
different primes p1,…,pr each (n/r)-bit long such that 
gcd(p1-1,…,pr-1) = 2. Set N = ∏ri=1 pi and φ(N) = ∏ri=1 
(pi-1). Compute r w-bit integers dp1,…, dpr satisfying 
gcd(dp1,p1-1) = … = gcd(dpr,pr-1) = 1 and dp1 ≡ … ≡ dpr 
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(mod 2). Find a d such that d = dp1 mod p1-1,…, d = dpr 
mod pr-1. Compute e = d-1 mod φ(N). The public key is 
<N,e> and the private key <p1,…,pr,dp1,…,dpr>. 
• Encryption: Encryption is the same as for the original 
RSA, C = Me mod N, but with a much larger e (as was 
the case with Rebalanced RSA). 
• Decryption: Decryption is the same as for Multi-Prime 
RSA. That is, decryption is split into r modular 
exponentiations Mi = Cdpi mod pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ r after 
which the Chinese Remainder Theorem is applied. The 
difference lies in the length of dpi (denoted di in Multi-
Prime RSA). In R-Prime RSA, these values are w-bit 
each. In Multi-Prime RSA, they are n/r each. 
This means that the decryption in R-Prime RSA requires r 
times O(w(n/r)2) (ignoring the Chinese Remainder Theorem). 
Compared to the O(n3) decryption of the original RSA, R-
Prime RSA improves decryption time with a factor 
n3 / (rw · (n/r)2) = nr/w. 
 
R-Prime RSA inherits the same security considerations as 
Rebalanced RSA and Multi-Prime RSA, i.e. it is recommended 
to set w ≥ 160 and limit the value of r with the respect to n as 
listed earlier. As in Rebalanced RSA, the speed-up in 
decryption means a much slower encryption. 
Since Multi-Power RSA is faster than Multi-Prime RSA, 
why not use Multi-Power RSA in R-Prime RSA? The reason 
lies in the technique Hensel Lifting that is used in decryption in 
Multi-Power RSA. Hensel Lifting makes use of a number of 
exponentiations modulo e which is not a problem in Multi-
Power RSA since e is small. But in R-Prime RSA, e is on the 
order of N making Hensel Lifting (and consequently, Multi-
Power RSA) disproportionately expensive. 
F. Comparison 
The following table compares the decryption time of the 
original RSA to all its variants (excluding Batch RSA). The 
table shows the complexity of decryption for each variant, their 
general theoretical improvement and their approximated 
improvement in practice when n = 1024, and r = 3 and w = 160 
where applicable: 
Variant Complexity Theo. Appr. 
Original O(n3) 1.0 1.0 
CRT 2 · O((n/2)3) 4.0 4.0 
Multi-Prime r · O((n/r)3) r2 9.0 
Multi-Power 2 · O((n/r)3) r2/2 13.5 
Rebalanced 2 · O(w(n/2)2) 2n/w 12.8 
R-Prime r · O(w(n/r)2) nr/w 19.2 
 
No single variant outperforms all the others. Which variant 
is best is a question of usage scenario. If both encryption and 
decryption is needed, then Multi-Prime or Multi-Power RSA 
should be best. If only encryption is needed, there is no need to 
upgrade from the original RSA. And if only decryption is 
needed, then R-Prime RSA promises the most improvement. 
III. IMPLEMENTATION 
We have implemented the original RSA and all its variants 
(except Batch RSA) to demonstrate their actual improvement 
in practice on modern mobile phones. 
As most mobile phones support Java's runtime 
environment, our implementation is written in Java's mobile 
platform Java 2 Micro Edition (J2ME). J2ME contains a subset 
of the Java Standard Edition (JSE). The Connected Limited 
Device Configuration (CLDC) and the Mobile Information 
Device Profile (MIDP) define the available APIs. We use the 
CLDC 1.1 and MIDP 2.1. These contain no general 
cryptographic API or a support for multi-precision   
computations like the BigInteger class. Therefore, we base the 
mathematical operations such as modular exponentiations on 
the BigInteger class from the bouncycastle.org [11]. 
The lack of built-in cryptographic APIs has the effect that 
each java application that require the use of cryptographic 
funcitons has to be bundled with code that provides such 
features. This leads to larger code sizes (in our case around 100 
KB) and prevents code sharing. 
Finally, note that we do not implement any textual 
transformations but only the core encryption and decryption of 
M and C, respectively. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Our implementation of the original RSA and its variants is 
tested on a HTC Touch Dual from 2007 with a Qualcomm 
MSM 7200 400MHz processor and 128MB SDRAM. We test 
encryption and decryption of the original RSA and decryption 
for all the variants. We set n = 1024, and r = 3 and w = 160 
where applicable. M is the same for all tests. 
The following table summarizes the results of our 
experiment by listing the average of twenty decryptions for 
each cryptosystem (and encryptions for the original RSA), the 
actual improvement in decryption and the approximated 
improvement in decryption (all figures are in ms): 
Variant Enc. Dec. Actual Appr. 
Original 29 2098 1.0 1.0 
CRT - 558 3.8 4.0 
Multi-Prime - 283 7.4 9.0 
Multi-Power - 210 10.0 13.5 
Rebalanced - 187 11.2 12.8 
R-Prime - 151 13.9 19.2 
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As expected, the actual improvement for each variant is less 
than the approximated improvement due to overhead from the 
Chinese Remainder Theorem and other arithmetic. This is most 
outspoken for Multi-Power and R-Prime making Rebalanced 
faster than Multi-Power while R-Prime retains its position as 
the fastest decryptor. As evident, the approximated 
improvements are useful as rough guidelines. 
It is interesting to note the relative improvement from CRT 
to Multi-Prime is bigger than the relative improvement from 
Rebalanced to R-Prime. An closer inspection of the variants 
reveals that this is due to the fact that the generalization from 
CRT to Multi-Prime results in both smaller exponents and 
moduli while the generalization from Rebalanced to R-Prime 
only leads to smaller moduli as the exponents are fixed at w = 
160. 
All in all, our experimental results show that the actual 
decryption time of each variant is well below one second – and 
verify that the actual encryption time of the original RSA is 
well below that of all the decryption times. 
V. CONCLUSION 
We have implemented the central part of various variants of 
the RSA cryptosystem: CRT RSA, Multi-Prime RSA, Multi-
Power RSA, Rebalanced RSA and R-Prime RSA and run a test 
on typical data that shows that they improve the decryption 
time of the original RSA considerably, achieving actual 
decryption times well below one second. 
Consequently, we are able to assert that both RSA 
encryption and decryption can be executed efficiently on a 
modern mobile phone. 
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